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AN APPRAISAL OF 11IE SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT POLICIES IN NIGERIA•
BY
DR M.O. OJO

Mmnd

external financing, rising domestic demand c.ao be supported
for a fairly long time, but such a situation is frequently
associated with growing current account deficits, the erosion
of international oompetitiveness owing to a high inflation rare,
misallocatioo of scarce resources arising, from price
distortions and an unbearable external debt burden. Since
access to external financing is grossly limiaed, the economic
crisis emerges sooner than later. The basic objective of the
structural adjustment programme is to correct the imbalance
such that the subsequent improvement in the external
payments position can be sustained. In general, the imb&laoce
is corrected by reducing domestic demand through monetary,
fiscal and other policy measures such as tighter monetary
controls, making imports dearer, removal of price subsidies
which will make local goods and services dearer, testraint
on real wages and cutback on government spending,
particularly when it does not directly aid a productive
activity. At the same time, aggregate supply is boosttd
through the removal of price distortions so that productive
factors are appropriaiely rewarded, as well as through
incentives for mobilization of domestic savings and
encouragement of local and foreign investment.
Usually, the implementation of the adjustment programme
results in economic hardships in the prcx;ess of reducing
aggregate demand in the short-run. Indeed, many observers
have maintained that most of the hardships are borne by the
poorer segments of the population, while the international
financial institutions and other observers have maintained that
if the programme had not been adopted and implemented,
1he poor would have suffered even more. But it is now
accepted that the social costs of structural adjustment cannot
be ignored, otherwise the initial gains of a programme could
be dissipated. Nigeria has implemenled a structural
adjustment prograrrune since July 1986, and while
Governmem has identified the gains of implementing the key
elements and emphasised the need to consolidale such
gains, it has also acknowledged the adverse effe.cts. Many
critics have continued to harp on these adverse developments,
particularly with respect to their effects on the poor people.
Some have even called for its abandonment. It is the view
of this paper that both the short and long-term impact of the
adjustment policies should be taken into account while
discussing the various controversial issues. The main purpose

~ paper app,wsed lhe eCON>mic and social impact of

du Strvctural Adjustment Programme in Nigeria from 1986
to early 1969, against du background of the observed
dowruMm in rise economy since IM early 1980s. On lhe
eco,,,omic impact, rhe paper found that 1he economy
respontkd fawmrably to the programme on the basis of tM
r«orded iN:ruue.r in domesdc OlllpMI and exports, especially
in lhe agrioltural sector, reduced dependence on the oil
sector for revenue and foreign exchange and on imports for
iltternaJ growth, as well as the greater efficiency in resource
alloootion observed in variow sectors of the economy:
IM ut~mal sector of 1he economy witnessed increased
pressures which could have been worse without the
programme. On the social impact, it was found 1haJ
inJensified injllJlionary pressures which reduced purchasing
power, as wtll as unemployment, deterioration in social
services and iaiJities and the worsening stilndard of Jiving
in tlte urban areas tended to erode some of the gains of 1he
programme. Policy measurer 10 fight inftarion, generate more
employmen, oppomutiries aNl improve urban transportation
~stems have been adopted /Ty the govemmen1, but would take
rime to make a sig1tifican1 impacl. The paper concluded that,
on balance, the programme has been an effective strategy
of reorientating the Nigerian economy for Jong-term
sustainable growth. BUi ii suggested that efforts would need
to be made lo implement effec1ively other economic policies
as a follow-up to 1he programme and to imegrate all policy
actions to minimise the adverse side effects ofthe programme,
especiaJJy on the poor.

Bw

lntnducdon
1be adoption of saucrural adjustmen1 programmes whether
supported by international financial instirutions, such as the
lntemational Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, or
self-imposed, is now a common feature of economic
1NJ188ement in many developing countries, especially in SubSaharan Africa. Generally, a structural adjusment
programme becomes necessary when a country faces a
serious economic disequilibrium or imbalance between
domestic aggregate demand and aggregate supply which
invariably results in a deteriorating e:uemaJ paymenls
position. Such an undesirable ee-onomic situation can usually
be traced to bad economic policies in the past which
acccleraled the growth of domestic demand far beyond the
productive capacity of the economy, leading to distortions
in relative prices to the detrimem of balaI1ced growth and
development. If the coumry involved has enough access 10

• An earlier "•"ion of this paper wu usea as a ..o,t1ng paper al a Seminar held 11
the World Bank. Washinglon, D.C. U.S.A. I IJTll•fullyackno..ledge the benefit
derived from that Seminar. Tho paper has also bcnefincd from the ideu and
commenlS_ of my colleagues in the Research Depanment (CBN). 1 he views
ex pressed tn the pe_per_are penonal and do not neceuarily reprtr.tnl those of the
Central Bank of Ntgcna on the subject.
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of this paper is therefore to evaluate the economic and social
impact of the structural adjustmet programme in Nigeria,
with panicular reference to (i) its benefits to the economy
and the social costs to the population and (ii) the prospects
for economic development of Nigeria under a regime of the
current structural adjustment policies.
The paper is organised into five main pans. Pan I contains
an outline of the economic policy measures adopted during

the programme. In Part II, an analysis of the economit: impact
of the programme is undertaken, while in part III an
assessment of the social impact is done. Pan IV contains a
review of government response to the adverse developments.
Part V contains the summary, conclusion and some
observations on the prospects for Nigeria's economic
development under the present structural adjustment policies.

PART I: POLICY MEASURES UNDER STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
Background to Adjustment Policies
The sad turning point observed in the Nigerian economy
in the early 1980s had its origins in the oil boom period of
1973-1980. The dramatic increases in oil prices in 1973/74
and 1979/80 had a positive impact on foreign exchange
earnings and government revenue from oil which induced
a rapid expansion in public sector activities, the rationale
being to utilise the available resources to expand
infrastructural facilities and build
the country's industrial
base. This strategy resulted in particular in massive public
investment in social and economic infrastructure in the
utilities, construction, transportation and communications,
housing and the social service sectors. One direct result of
this development is that most of the public assets in Nigeria
today were initiated during that period. But it is also true
that many of the investment projects were unviable, poorly
implemented and had generally overtasked the capacity of
the fragile public sector.
The macroeconomic policy framework which guided
government actions during the period had several undesirable
features. Firstly, both the Federal and State Governments
increased their expenditures substantially not only within
available resources, but also to incure deficits panicularly
when there were shortfalls in revenue. Secondly.
macroeconomic policies resulted in large distortions in the
pattern of investment in favour of construction, transpon ,
communication and other service sectors which had better
returns on investment than in agriculture and industry which
therefore suffered. Thirdly, the impon bias of the period
helped to sustain the industrial sector through the easy access
to foreign inputs. Industrial production wnich grew
appreciably did not have its root in the domestic economy
with the adverse result of low value-added and backward
linkage. Fourthly, the trade and exchange rate regime placed
severe pressures on the domestic production sectors. The
import licensing system did not encourage efficient allocation
of resources a11d lhe overvalued exchange rate placed
agricultural and other e~pons at an uncompetitive position
in the world markets. Industries that depended on foreign
inputs were implicitly protected at the expense of those that
depended on local raw materials. Finally, by and large. the
monetary polic) stance in the midst of these developments
appeared fairly successful. The system of credit allocation
and inierest rate structure which favoured the domestic
productive sectors tried to effect some structural changes in
the economy. but the expansionary fi scal policies and the
trade and exchange regime worked in the opposite direction .
The ultimate effects of these policy actions were adverse

for the real sector. The domestic production of goods and
services performed below expectation and this contributed
to the pressures in the external and domesic sectors of the
economy. The low productivity in agriculture resulted in
reduced production for expon as well as substantial rise in
food impons. Apan from the high dependence on imponed
inputs and the low value-added in the manufacturing sector,
high costs of production were not matched by a high standard
of quality of local manufactured products. In spite of the
heavy investments in the service industries, the nee.ds of the
country were far from being met, particularly with regard
to electric power generation and water supply. The immediate
cause of the economic crisis in 1981 was the collapse of the
international oil market price which had serious repercussions
for Nigeria's balance of payments, public finances and the
economy as a whole. At first, it was hoped that the adverse
development would be shonlived and no concrete action was
taken. In fact, the down-turn continued up to 1986.
Government's first main reaction was in April 1982 when
the Federal Government promulgated the Economic
Stabilization Act designed to arrest the deterioration of the
economy through more stringent exchange control measures
and import restrictions supponed by appropriate monetary
and fiscal policies. In October 1985, the Federal Government
declared a 15-month Economic Emergency period in pursuit
of funher economic stabilization. The major action was the
compulsory deductions from workers' salaries and company
profits. In January 1986, 80 per cent of the petroleum subsidy
was removed . Efforts staned in 1983 to reschedule external
debts were also intensified. However, the various policy
measures did not produce the desired effects, while the
population was experiencing hardships which it had not seen
in the previous 15 years. This situation made it clear that
a more purposeful economic adjustment was required to
revive the economy.

up

Objectives and Strategies of Economic Adjustment
The Structural Adjustment Programme (-SAP) introduced
by the Federal Government in July 1986 for an initial twoyear period had the overall aim of restructuring the production and consumption pattern of the economy , as well as
eliminating price distortions and the overdependence on the
expon of c rude oil and impons of producer and consumer
goods. The specific objectives were to :
/ai
restructure and diversify the productive base of the
ernnomy in orde r w reduce dependence on the oil
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sector and on import~:
achieve fiscal and balance of payments viability during
the two years;
(c) lay the basis for a sustainable non-inflationary growth;
and
(d) Jessen the dominance of unproductive public sector
investments, improve its efficiency and expand the
growth potential of the private sector.
The programme outlined three important policy
instruments for attaining these basic objectives. First was the
adoption of a realistic ex~hange rate policy in conjunction
with the liberalisation of the external trade and payments
system. Second was the adoption of relevant pricing policies
in a.II sectors with greater reliance on market forces and
consequent reduction in complex administrative controls.
Finally, there was to be further rationalisation and
restructuring of puNic expenditure and customs tariffs. The
various policy measures under the Programme are reviewed
below:

with excess profits being returned 10 tht• CBN. In the
Interbank Market, initiaJly. all transactions were carried out
at the rate established at the most recent auction adjusted for
a dealing margin which allowed a maximum buy-sell spread
of one per cent. In January 1987. price setting in the interbank market was liberalised which implied that it could respond to shifts in supply and demand. although dealers were
still obliged to both buy and sell at their quoted rates, except
for the one per cent buy-sell spread. On June 15, 1987, dealers' biddings on the auction market were required to reflect
specifo: customer demand which meant that the free interbank.
rate would only apply to funds obtained from autonomous
sources. In an attempt to stabilise the naira exchange rate
and encourage more rational behaviour in the operations of
the FEM for enhancing :ts efficiency. both the FEM auction
rate and autonomous funds rate were merged in January
1989. Under the new arrangements. sales of available foreign
exchange are made from official sources by the CBN to the
banks daily at rates fixed by the CBN on the basis of their
quotations and developments in the local and international
financial markets.
These developments in the FEM have been accompanied
by significant changes in the funding or the market, foreign
exchange allocation and inflow, as well as the na ira exchange
rates. Since the introduction of the new exchange rate policy,
funding of the market has been inadequate. In 1986, a.
monthly average of US $290.3 million was offered for sale
in SFEM. But in 1987, this average level declined by 33.8
per cent to US $192. 2 million a month. In 1988, the funding
improved when it increased by 24.8 per cent to US $239.9
million monthly. It should also be observed that the amount
of foreign exchange offered for sale was only a small fraction
of market demand. The bulk. of official funds (ranging
between 65 and 80 per cent) was allocated to the industrial
sector. Autonomous inflow of foreign exchange increased
steadily. It moved from a monthly average of US $75.9
million in 1986 to US $'90.3 million and US $!03.6 million
in 1987 and 1988, respectively. The value of the Naira visa-vis the US Dollar has edged downwards since 1986. At the
end of that year, the SFEM rate stood at US $1.00 =
N3.1828, while it moved down to US $1.00 = N4.1664
and US $1.00 = N4.7l67 at the end of 1987 and 1988
respectively. At the end of April 1989, the naira stood at
US $LOO = N7.58l0 in the new interbank mark.et, thus
bringing the rate of depreciation of the Naira since the first
auction in 1986 to nearly 80 per cent.

(b)

Exchange Rate Policy
A more dynamic exchange rate policy formed the
cornerstone of the SAP. Its aim was to evolve a realistic and
market-determined exchange rate for the Naira in order to
reduce the excessive demand for available foreign exchange
and mounting pressures on the balance of payments. Overall,
it was expected to support self-sustaining growth through the
elimination of price distortions, reduction of imports,
promotion of exports and encouragement of capital inflow.
In September 1986, the Second-Tier Foreign Exchange
Market (SFEM) was introduced to operate alongside the
official first-tier market which accommodated only payments
for public sector debt service and obligations to international
organisations and embassies. Under the SFEM, a floating
exchange rate system in which the price mechanism allocated
foreign exchange among competing uses was adopted. In July
1987, the market-determined exchange rate was unified with
the first-tier rate under the new Foreign Exchange Mar!-_et
(FEM) which comprised foreign exchange dealings between
(i) the Central Bank of Nigeria. (CBN) and the authorised
foreign exchange dealers, (ii) the authorised dealers and the
public in the autonomous funds market and (iii) among
authorised dealers in the inter-bank market.
Several changes were subse.quently introduced into the
modalities of the FEM auction system. In April 1987, the
Dutch Auction System whereby authorised dealers paid their
bid prices, replaced the earlier system in which each
successful dealer paid the marginal rate that exhausted the
IOtal amount of foreign exchange offered. Ir. December 1987,
winning dealers were required to sell foreign exchange
purchased on their auction to their clients at the rate that the
clients had bid, rather than at the rates paid by the dealers,

External Trade Policy
At the inception of the SAP, the import licensing system
was abolished together with exchange control on all current
transactions. The number of prohibited import items
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addition to the retention of total proceeds of foreign exchange
by exporters, a Duty Draw-back/suspension Scheme was
introduced in 1987 to enable exporters import raw materials
and intennediate products for use in the manufacture of
export products free of import duty and other indirect raxea
and charges. Other export promotion me.asures which had
received some attention in terms of implementation include
the proposed est.ablishment of the Export Development Fund,
Export Perfonnance Grant Fund, Export Price Adjustment
Scheme Fund and the Export Credit Guarantee and Insurance
Scheme.

was reduced from 74 to only 16. Also, the 30 per cent import
levy introduced in January 1986 was abolished, except the
Port Development surcharge (5 %) for the Nigerian Ports
Authority, the Raw Materials Research and Development
Council surcharge (I%) and the Freight Rate Stabilisation
surcharge (0.02%) for the Nigerian Shippers Council all of
which were reintroduced in January I 987. AJso in January
1987 the system of advance payment of import duties
whereby importers were required to pay the relevant import
Jutic~ when letters of credit were opened was modified.
Under the new system, only 25 per cent of the duty assessed
would be paid, while the balance would be settled when the
goods finally arrive. With the dismantling of import and
foreign exchange controls, customs and excise duty schedules
were overhauled, especially to produce desirable incentives
to the productive sectors. Provisionally, the customs and
excise tariff schedule introduced in October I 986 reduced
the average nominal rate of protection by about IO per cent.
After a comprehensive tariff study late in 1987, a new tariff
structure was introduced in the 1988 budget. Under the new
1.ariff regime, import duty rates were outlined for a sevenyear period which would permit both producers and
consumers some adequate planning horizon a.nd effective
decision making. Average nominal rate of prptection was
slightly adjustc.d upwards from the interim level of 1987, but
was still lower than the level before SAP. The new tariff
structure aUo introduced a landing charge to serve as an
implicit tax on imports corresponding to the excise on similar
domestic output which could serve as variable consumption
1.ax for raising government revenue without changing the
1.ariff protection regime. Also, the practice of general
concessionary rates on imported inputs for certain producers
was abolished, while discretionary duty exemptions,
es!)Ceially for government imports, were reduced. A Tariff
Review Board was set up in the middle of 1988 to examine
1.ariff complaints and to establish the framework for
monitoring the effectiveness of these measures aimed at
promoting competitiveness and effieien~y in domestic
economic activities.
Under the SFEM, non-oil exporters were pennitted to
reiain 100 per cent of their foreign exchange earnings in
domiciliary accounts oh which they can freely draw to meet
all eligible foreign exchange transactions. Export prohibitions
were also abolished although the exports of grains and tubers
have since been banned because of the local shortage of these
items. Export lkensing requirements have also been reduced
to the barest minimum. In a major move late in 1986, the
Government dissolved the Commodity Boards which had
hitherto been charged with the external marketing of
Nigeria's scheduled export produce. The Commodity Boards
were abolished because they had begun to constitute a
constraint on the local and external marketing of the produce
under their ~·ontrol. thereby discouraging the primary
productilln of such produce. In April 1987. a new export
finan"·~ facility. the R~financing and Rediscounting Facility
was intnldu"·oo by the Central Bank to assist private exporters
thrnu~h thdr banks to finance their marketing activities.
l'ndcr rh,! facility. the CBN can provide refinancing for the
export of both agricultural and non-agricultural products for
period~ 1if up to one year at the Bank's rediscount rate. In

Fiscal Policy
Most of the policy measures described above were
announced as fiscal measures. These measures, together with
the revenue and expenditure strategies. were intended to
achieve fiscal balance during the SAP. It was clear at the
inception of the programme that financial resources for public
expenditures would be much less than envisaged because of
the declining oil revenue and the subsLa.ntial debt repayments
falling due. Consequently, it was the Government's intention
to adjust public expenditures to reflect the revenue constraints
with the ultimate aim of cont.aining budgetary deficits within
3.5 per cent of GDP. In order to reduce general expenditures,
government was to take the following measures: (i) minimise
the growth of public sector wage bill throu&h holding down
employment and wage increases; (ii) concentrate on
maintaining adequate supplies and maintenance of
infrastructures to ensure efficient delivery of public services;
(iii) reduce to the barest minimum non-statutory transfers
to all economic and quasi-economic parast.atals; (iv) complete
on-going projects on the basis of their economic viability and
proportionate completion costs, with priority accorded those
with high economic viability and high completion "atios; and
(v) undertake new projects only where they are elearly
essential for the economic recovery process and their funding
clearly established.
However, the fiscal operations of the Federal Government
during the programme were out of tune with Largeted levels.
In 1986, for inst.ance, a budget deficit of N8,254.3 million
was incurred by the Federal Government, which was 10.3 per
cent of GDP in comparison with the target of 3.5 per cent.
In 1987, the ratio declined to 4.2 per cent, but under the
influence of the reflationary package of 1988, the
deficit/GDP ratio increased to 8.5 per cent. The increased
levels of budget deficits since the start of the programme
reflected an accelerated expansion of expenditures relative
to revenue receipts. Total revenue of 1le Federal Government
increased by an average of about 27 per cent a year between
1986 and I 988. whereas total expenditure increased by an
annual average of 30 per cent. Recurrent expenditures
increased faster by 44.7 per cent a year, while capit.al
expenditures grew by 20.5 per cent per annum. On the other
hand. judged by the declining levels of budget deficits, st.ate
government finances appeared to have improved. Overa~I
budget deficit of state governments declined by 89 .5 per cent
from Jis 1.070.3 million in 1986 to r.111.9 million in 1987
and declined further by 5.3 per cenl 10 ~ 106.3 million in
1988. While the current revenue of state government~
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increased by an average of about 50 per cent a year during
the Programme, total expenditure increased by an average
of 35 per cent a year.

to 13.25 per cent in January 1989; and
(iv)

In oder lo give banks the much needed flexibility in

their creilit operations, the sector specific credit
distribution targets were funher compressed into four
sectors in 1986 and two sectors in 1987. Under the twosector categorisation, agriculture and manufacturing
enterprises have been regarded as priority sectors,
receiving at least 50 per cent of credit allocation. Smallscale enterprises wholly owned by Nigerians have been
given special consideration in credit allocation out of
which at least 15 per cent has been reserved for them.
Similarly. in order to complement effons to transfonn
the rural areas and stem rural-urban migration,
commercial hanks have been mandated to lend to rural
borrowers at least 45 per cent of total deposits
rrmhilised by their rural branches.
Monetary developments during the programme reflected
an accommodative attitude of the expansionarv fiscal
operations outlined earlier. Consequently. monetary and
cr«lit targets specified in the Programme were generally not
adhered to. Bank credit to the domestic economy increased
by 12.7, 12.4 and 26.l per cent in 1986, 1987 and 1988,
respectively, compared with the targeted expansion rates of
8. 7. 4.4, and 8.1 per cent. Credit to the private sector grew
by an average of 19 .4 per cent a year during the pr:ogramme
compared with the average target of I 1.6 per cent a year.
Claims on the government increased by 2.5, 14.4 and 30.0
per cent in 1986, 1987 and 1988 compared with target
increases of 5.9, 1.5 and 2.5 per cent, respectively. The
excessive growth in bank creilit resulted in a rapid expansion
of the money stock. Its narrow measure (MI), after falling
by 4. I per cent in 1986, increased by 17. I and 43. 9 per cent
in 1987 and 1988, compared with the targets of 11.8 and
15.0 per cent, respectively.

Monetary Polley
Monecary policy measures under the SAP were designed
lO stabilise the economy and to induce the emergence of a
market-oriented financial system for effective mobilization
of financial savings and efficient resource allocati.:m. In order
to dampen inflationary pressures and restrict the demand for
available foreign exchange resources, the CBN required the
banks in August 1986 to deposit in non-interest bearing
deposit account at the Bank the naira equivalent of all
outstanding external payments arrears. A total of .N:4.2
bi1lion was deposited with the C BN at the end of the exercise.
In pursuance of a tight monetary policy and greater
competition and more efficient allocation of resources, the
following policy measures have been adopted under the
Programme:
(i)

On the introduction of the SAP in 1986, the IO per
cent ceiling imposed on the rate of credit expansion
by the big and medium-sized commercial banks fixed
earlier in the year was reduced to 8 per cent for the
rest of I 986 and 1987. In August l 987, this was again
reduced to 7 .4 per cent for the last three quarters of
the year. Any excess in credit e:i.pansion was required
to be deposited with the CBN free of inlerest. But under
the reflationary package of l 988, the growth in credit
expansion by commercial banks was raised to 12.5 per
cent. From August 1988, du:e to the overheating of the
economy, total loans and ad vane.es by commercial
banks were programmed to grow by not more than 7. I
per cent over the June l 988 level and by no more than
2. 7 and 4.3 per cent in the third and founh quarters
respectively. These targets were made applicable to the
merchant banks whose cr«lit ceiling was hitheno
prescribed as a percentage of their total eligible assets
outstanding at die end of the previous ye.ar. These ratios
at 50,
55, 37.5 , 47 per
had been fixed
cent in 1986, January 1987, August 1987 and January
1988, respectively. In January 1989, with a
background of excess liquidity in the banking system
and inflationary pressures, the pennissiblerate of credit
expansion by both commercial and mercl\,aflt banks was
reduced to IO per cent;
(ii) With respect to inlerest rates, the 9 ½ per cent interest
rate on savings deposits was retained at the inception
of SAP, but in place of the range of 8½ - 12 per cent
interest rate payable on time deposits, a floor of- 8 1/2
per cent was fixed, while the bank lending rate was
raised from 13 to 15 per cent. In August 1987, all
controls on interest rates were removed in suppon of
the policy of deregulation of the economy under SAP;
(iii) The treasury bill rate was raised from IO to 14 per cent
in order to encourage the private sector non-bank
public to invest in government securities. The
minimum rediscount rate which was raised from 11
to 15 per cent in August 1987 was reiluced to 12. 75
per cent under the 1988 reflationary budget. but rai~ed

External Debt Management
Nigeria's huge external debt estimated at about US $26
billion in l 987 had a large potential to constraint economic
recovery. Consequently, it was the intention of government
to undenake its effective management to minimise its adverse
impact in lenns of the burden of repayments of principal and
interest. Early in 1986, government had detennined that it
would be unable to accommodate a debt service ratio higher
than 30 per cent of expon earnings. The Stand-by Agreement
with the Fund in 1986 enabled Nigeria to negotiate with the
London and Paris Clubs of creditors for the rescheduling of
1986 and 1987 obligations which fell due. The rescheduling
agreements which were signed in 1987 amounted to US $.6
billion. Also, the reconciliations of trade arrears embarked
upon in 1984 were substantially concludeil by December
l 987 and promissory notes were issued. However, because
of shortage of foreign exchange. arreas of payments were
accumulated, especially on the promissory notes due for
redemption. Proposals were therefore made to note holders
for the rescheduling of US $4.8 billion payable in 22 years
with 2 years of grace. These proposals were accepted, while
inlerest payment of 5 per cent during the grace period and
4 per cent thereafter was also agreed. Further successes were
achieved in 1988 in the debt rescheduling e:i.ercise. By the
end of Septeml:ier 1988, an agreement was reached to

42

reschedule a total of US $5.9 billion owed to the London
Club of creditors. All debt owed to the London Club were
consolidated and rescheduled over 20 years beginning in
1989. including a three year grace period.
In February 1988, a Debt Conversion programme was
adopted to supplement Nigeria's debt management strategy,
as well as to enhance capital inflow and productive
investments in the economy. As at end-December 1988, 82
applications worth US $1 .87 billion had been received for
conversion. Most of the applications were in respect of
agricultural and manufacturing projects. Out of these
applications, 50 worth US $618.6 million were approved in
principle. In 1988, about US $70 million worth of debts was
offered for conversion under the Programme.

----------------------

For purpose of implementation under the SAP. the public
sector en1erprise~ v. ere classified into five broad categories:
fully privatised. partially privatised. fully commercialised.
partially commercialised and wholly public enterprises.
Enterprises which already function in a fully commercial way
are to be fully privatised. while those to be partially privatised
through the sale of part of their government equity holding
will operate as private companies without any operating
subventions from the Government. Enterprises to be
commercialised will continue to be government-owned but
will be reformed to enable them raise private capital. Those
to be fully commercialised will operate wihout government
financial support while those to be partially commercialised
will generate a fair proportion of their financial resources
independently but will continue to receive government
subventions to cover part of operating costs and capital
investment. Those enterprises that will continue to be wholly
public institutions will be financed b)( the government but
will be required to impose user charges as may be
appropriate.
In 1988, the Federal Government passed the enabling law
fomllllising the implementation modalities of the programme.
The Privatisation and Commercialisation Decree No. 25 of
1988, provides for the setting up of a Technical Committee
on Privatisation and Commercialisation to oversee the
implementation of the programme. Among other functions,
the Committee is to advise on the capital restructuring of
enterprises to be privatised or commercialised, carry out aJI
activities required for Lhe successful public issues of shares
of such enterprises, negotiate with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on a fair price for each issue and
oversee the actual sale of shares of the enterprises concerned
by the issuing houses. In furtherance of these functions, the
Committee announced early in 1989 the public sale of Federal
Government shares in two enterprises - the Flour Mills of
Nigeria and African Petroleum. Many more enterprises have
been scheduled for such exercise.

Public Sector Reform
The public enterprise sector in the country is extremely
large and has been largely unproductive in relation to the
substantial investments undertaken. At the Federal
Government level alone, the public enterprises on the eve
of adopting structural adjustment numbered about 140,
engaged in agriculture, mining. manufacturing, transport,
commercial and other activities. Total investment in the
enterprises was about M23 billion (comprising loans and
equity capital) yielding only about 2 per cent annual rate of
return. The Federal Government not only paid the maturing
debt obligations of the enterprises, but also was responsible
for about 30 per cent of their capital investment budget and
about 40 per cent of non-salary recurrent expenditure. One
of the major aspects of the SAP was to initiate radical refonns
of these enterprises in the form of privatisation and
commercialisation. Privatisation was planned to reduce the
size of the public sector to a manageable size, especiaJly in
areas where private sector enterprises could operate more
efficiently. Commercialisation was aimed at decentralising
decision making and encouraging financial independence
needed for more effective management control and
accountability.

PART II: ECONOMIC IMPACT OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
1985, respectively, brought the average growth rate for the
1981-1985 period to only 0.8 per cent a year. However, the
GDP recorded an increase in each of the years I 986-1988,
resulting in an average growth rate or 3.0 per cent a year
during the programme. Both agricultural and industrial
production contributed to the increase in domestic output
during the programme.
The index of agricultural production which increased on
the average by only 0.4 per cent a year between 1981 and
1985, recorded an annual growth rate of2.6 per cent during
the programme. Favourable weather conditions rather than
the direct impa~t of structural adjustment policies have been
identified as an important factor in better agricultural
performance during the programme. For instance in 1986,

The economic impact of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria
between 1986 and 1988 can be assessed by observing changes
in domestic output, composition of output and trade, as well
as changes in the external sector to the extent that the
implementation of the programme can be identified with these
developments.

Domestic Output
The gross domestk product (GDP) assumed an upward
movement during the implementation of the programme.
During 1981-1985 which preceded the introduction of
structural adjustment policies, the GDP recorded no change
in 1982 and negative growth rates in 1983 and 1984. The
positive growth rates of 7 .0 and 7. 9 per cent in I 98 I and
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stimulating agricultural exports. The abolition of the comcommodity boards in Nigeria since 1986 has introdu~ a
dynamic agricultural pricing policy which has a big potential
for boostmg agricultural production for export in particu Jar.
The producer prices of major agricuhural export crops have
increased by multiples since the adjustment was started. For
instance. lhe local producer price of cocoa beans increased
from only N 1,(i(l() per metric ton before structural adjustment
to an average of N 7,500 per metric ton between l 986 and
1988. The locat producer prices of cotton, rubber and coffee
have also increased substantially.
The production of staple food crops, except for the
recorded fall in 1987 due to adverse weather mentioned
earlier, was generally satisfactory. It recorded an average
increase of 5. 9 per cent a year between 1986 and 1988, in
comparison with the 6.2 per cent average increase before
the adjustment. Nevertheless, this fairly good performance
might be subsaantiaHy discounted by the observed substantial
food price increases in lhe same period. What seems to have
happened was that with the adjustment process. a lot of
demand shifted to local foodstuff especially from industrial
food processors, while the prohibition placed on lhe
importation of wheat, rice and maize, among other food
items. tendeo to limit local supplies. Other sources of
pressures on food prices were the diversion to export and
the excess liquidity in lhe economy particularly in 1988. On
the whole, the objective of limiting food imports under the
adjustment programme was achieved to a large extent even
if through physical controls. But, it does seem clear that
domestic food production performance has not coped with
the growth in demand and this led recently to a prohibition
of exports of some food items.
Of lhe other subsectors of agriculture. fishery output
continued to be adversely affected _bl_!nadequate allocation
of foreign exchange and escalating cost of fishing inpUls sucn.
as nets, vessels and spare parts. These problems were
observed before adjustment policies were adopted in 1986.
In fact, in 1984 and 1985, fish production declined by 30.5
and 40.0 per cent respectively. Increases of 17.2 and 38.3
per cent were recorded in 1986 and 1987, but in 1988, a
decline of 25.5 per cent was observed. The input problems
intensified during adjustment, especially in the artisanal
subsector where it was difficult for operators to buy new
outboard engines or main1.ain the old ones effectively. Olher
constraints included the high cost of automative gas oil and
lubricants arising from the partial removal of fuel subsidy
under the adjustment programme. A similar development
affecte.d poultry production which experienced lhe problem
of inadequate feed due to the short-supply of imported feed
inputs and disease control drugs.
The industrial sector perhaps responded more dearly to
the adjustment programme than other economic sectors.
During 1986-88, the index of industrial production increased
by an average of 9 .4 per cent a year, compared with rhe
average decline of 1.6 per cent a year between 1981 and
1985. However, it is the manufacturing component that
appears more relevant for review. Here, lhe perfonnance
was generaUy satisfactory. After declining by 3.9 per cent
in 1986, the index of manufacturing production iocreued

adequate and timely rainfall appeared to have induced the
growth of 6.S per cent in tol.llI agricultural output, whereas
the reverse was experienced in 1987 when low rainfall led
to a fall of 1.8 per cent in total agricultural production.
However, one remark.able development during the period and
which coold be attributed to the new economic policy changes
generally wu the increased tempo of movement of
individuals to the agricultural and related activities. This
development could have had a marginal impact on output
during the period and could be a positive sign for the future.
Of the various components of agricultural production, the
cash crop sub-sector recorded the most consistent
performance. In 1986-1988, the component increased by 2. 9
per cent a year in comparison with 3.3 per cent in 19811985. But where.as cash crop production consistently went
up during the period, it experienced downward movements
in 1982 and 1983 in the pre-SAP period. The major cash
crops contributing to the improvement were groundnut, pahn
kernels, rubber and cocoa whose output increased by 7.5,
15.0, 10.0 and 35.0 per cent, respectively, between the two
sub-periods. Minor cash crops like sheanut and soyabeans
alllO performed much better than in the pre-adjustment period.
The impact of structural adjustment on agricultural exports,
particularly of the cash crops was remarkable. There is
evidence that a good portion of total agricultural production
was diverted to exports during the period because of the new
price incentives arising from the improved marketing
conditions and currency depreciation which boosted local
earnings. The total volume of agricultural exports increased
by 19.4 and 30.7 per cent in 1986 and 1987, respectively,
while in 1988 it increased further by 9.6 per cent. At 439.8
thousand metric tons in 1988, the total export volume of
agricultural commodities was more than 70 per cent higher
than the pre-adjustment average eii:port volume. The most
important products contributing to the increase were cocoa
beans, palm kernels, rubber, hides and skins, as well as
coffee, edible nuts and gum arabic. The significant increase
in row expon volume and the suMtantial depreciation of the
Naira exchange rate resultro in a similar big increase in the
tocal value of agricultural exports. The total value of
agricultural exports increased by 1111 average of 65 .4 per cent
a year du.ring 1986-1988 and at over N 1.0 billion in 1988
wu more than four times the level in the year preceding the
adoption of adjustment policies. All products contributed lo
the remarkable performance. But, cocoa beans and products,
palm kernels and products, natural rubber, and bides and
slcim were the major sources of the increased ex port values.
It should be observed that in terms of US dollars. the total
export value did not perform as satisfactorily as the naira
values indicate. In fact, in 1987, the total export value, at
US $260.1 million, was 17 .5 per cent below the 1986 level.
The total dollar value went up by 20.3 per cent in 1988, but
was still nwginally below lhe 1988 level of US $315.3
million. Th.is development could be partly due to movements
in lhe dollar exchange rate, but the main problem which has
been observed in the recent past was the declining trend in
the world prices of primary commodities.
There is no doubt thAll enhanced prices arising from the
new exchange rate regime has been an important factor in
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by 33.6 and 13.7 per cent in 1987 and 1988 respectively,
bringing the average rale of growth of output in the subsector
to 14 ..'5 per cent, compared with 1.4 per cent in the preadjustment period. Average capacity utilization in the
sublector also recovered. FaJling persistently from a peak
of 73.3 per cent in 1981 to a low of 37. I per cent in 198.'5,
•verage capacity utilization rose to 38.2, 42.0 and 44 . .'5 in
1986, 1987 and 1988, respectively. Higher than average
capacity utilization has been recorded in enterprises such as
bea and stout, industrial chemicals, textiles, tyres ar.d rubes,
printing and publishing, cement and plastics which have
sourced a substantial proportion of their raw materials inputs
locally. But manufacruring enterprises like auto assembly
plants and paints had lower capacity utilization due to
continued heavy dependence on imported inputs. Trade
liberalisation measures implemente.d during the adjustment
as well u the adjustment in the exchange rate of the naira
no doubt positively influenced lhe incentive suucrure for local
manufacturing industries. Firstly, there has been e.asier access
to foreign exct.;mge resources for the importation of raw
material inputs and spare parts. Unlike the situation under
the unport licensing regime, the market-determined exchange
rate and a more efficient foreign exchange allocation have
made access to foreign exchange easier. This has obviated
the need, to a great extent, to hold large stocks of imported
inputs, raw materials and spare parts, as well as large
numben of employees to sustain the spurts in production.
Secondly, the incentive to use local raw material inputs has
been enhanced due mainly to the inadequate volume of
foreign exchange for importing raw materials as weU as their
high cost following the depredation of the naira exchange
rate. Thirdly, the adjustment process has encouraged export
activities in the manufacturing subsector, particularly in
enterprises where local sourcing of raw materials has been
very high. The increased competitiveness of these enterprises
wu brought about by the depreciated naira exchange rate.
Correspondingly, those enterprises that enjoyed cheap
imported inputs when the naira was overvalued and have not
shifted significantly to the use of local inpulS are now being
penalised- for beiDg inefficient users of scarce foreign
exchange relOW'CCs. One negative development has been the
substantial increase in production costs at a time when
purchasing power has been erode.d by high inflation rates.
Increased costs of production have been recorded in all
enterpriaes due mainly to more expensive imports and the
iDt'lationary expectations built into activities in the unstable
foreign exchange market. In some cases where trade
Ubenlisation has not been fully permitted, such as in the
importation of some agro-based raw materials, prices of
finished l()Ods of local manufactu.rers have risen subst.at1:ially
due 10 biah production costs and may even have slowed down
the lhift to local sourcing of raw materials.

In the output sectors. the non-oil sectors have grown faster
than the oil sec1or. Between 1986 and 1988. the non-oil GDP
grew on average by 3.8 per cent a year. while the oil sector
declined by an average of I .1 per cent a year. The declining
trend in the oil sector was in fact minimised by Lhe 8.8 per
cent growth in output in 1988 in contrast to the declines of
10.5 and 1.7 percent in 1987 and 1986, respectively. The
higher growth in non-oil GDP resulted in a slight rise in its
share of total GDP from 84_6 per cent in 1984-198.'5 to 86.3
per cent in 1986-1988. Correspondingly. the share of the oil
sector declined from 15.4 per cent in the earlier period to
13.7 per cent in 1986-1988. To the extent that the observed
increase in the tempo of activities in the agricultural and
manufacruring sectors can be sustained, the slight shift to
the non-oil sectors could be the start of a desirable longterm structural change of domestic output.
Diversificarion away from oil as a specified objective of
structural adjustment had an important implication for
dependence on crude oil export earnings and revenue. If the
basic objective was being abined, there should be a
noticeable fall in the ratios of oil to total export earnings and
oil to total revenue. In the period preceding adjustment ( 19811985), the ratio of oil to total export earnings ranged between
96.0 and 98.6 per cent with an average of97.4 per cent for
the period. During the programme, the ratio ranged between
88.4 and 93.8 per cent, resulting in an average of 91.7 per
cent. The ratio progressively decline.d from 93.8 per cent
in 1986 to 82.9 and 88.4 per cent in 1987 and 1988,
respectively. Although the ratio was still large considering
the relatively small share of oil in the GDP, the observed
trend was a satisfactory performance as far as the aim of the
Adjustment programme was concerned. With regard to the
contribution of the oil sector to government revenue, the
trend observed in the early 1980s was generally maintained.
In the period 1981- I 985, the ratio of oil revenue to the total
Federally-collected revenue ranged between 66.4 and 74.4
per cent, with an average contribution of 70.8 per cent a year.
The average contribution of oil to total revenue during the
programme was 72.8 per cent, while it ranged from 65.9
per cent in 1986 to 76.7 per cent in 1988.
Two major problems emerged in the pre-adjustment period
regarding the importation of goods and services into the
country. The level of importation of goods and services itself
was extremely large, particularly in a period when cxpon
earnings were falling rapidly and unstable. This situation
created serious problems for foreign exchange management.
In addition, the structure of impons was lopsided in favour
of consumer goods, especially food items. The adjustment
process was expected to alter these situations such that there
would be less dependence on imports, while the structure
of imports should favour the most productive secton of the
economy. In fact, the process of adjustment had staffed
earlier than 1986 when some bold measures were men to
adjust import levels to the avaihible foreign exchange
resources. Between 1981 and 198.'5, the total value of imports
declined by 2.6 per cent a year following the measures taken.
But between 1986 and 1988, the total value of imports
increased at an annual rate of 74.8 per cent. However, this
was entirely due to lhe large depreciation of the naira

Ovenlepenclence oa OU and Imports

One of the cardinal objectives of the Adjusbnent
Programme was to restructure the economy so that the overdepe8'fencc on crude oil and imports would be substantially
reduced. Some pogreas was made in lhis direction, but this
might not have been significant in relation to expectation.
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exchange rate dunng the period. In dollar term~ the total
,alue of imports actually declined by 4.3 per cent a year
durin, the period, which was a significant achieve~ent given
that intemalional price levels increased markedly m the same
period.
With regard to the strucrural composition of imports, there
was a shift from consumer goods to capital goods and raw
ma1erials, which was a desirable trend. Before the adjusnnent
process in 1986, consumer goods constiruted, on the average,
38.8 per cent of total imports. However, between 1986 and
1988, the share of consumer goods out of total imports had
declined to 27 .S per cent a year. The share of capital goods
increased from 32.7 to 38.4 per cent, while that of raw
materials increased from 28.1 to 34. I per cent. Within the
component of consumer goods, the share of food imports
declined from IS.6 per cent in 1981-1985 to I 1.8 per cent
in 1986-1988. But, much as the increased level of raw
materia.J impons would have supPOned productive activities,
it was still an undesirable trend since the adjustment process
should foster a shift from imported to local inpuis,
panicularly in raw materials for local industries.

~ 14,167.2 and~ 15,396.6 million in 1986, 1987 and 1988,
respectively. This development was uaceable co the increases
in outpayments in respect of shipment, other transponation
and interest on external loans.
Foreign exchange flows through the economy couW also
serve as a measure of the stability of the external sector.
Subject to the fact that not all foreign exchange which should
have been spent was acrually spent, the foreign exchange
movements during the programme have not been too
unsatisfactory. 1ne foreign exchange net inflows which were
recorded in 1984 and 1985 following the reverse si111ation
in the early I 980s were generally sustained between I 986
and 1988. Net inflows during the latter period averaged
~3.127.4 million, compared with only ~458.1 million in
1984 and 1985,.although the precipitous decline of76.9 per
cent in net inflow to ~ 1,246.3 million in 1988 was
disturbing. Both inflow and outflow have grown faster than
in the pre-adjustment period. Between 1986 and 1988, to<al
inflow increased by 45. I per cent a year, compared with the
average decline of 2.S per cent between 1981 and 1985. Total
outflow iocreased by 47.2 per cent a year in 1986-1988,
compared with the decline of 8.2 per cent in 1981-1985. The
downward movement of net inflow during the programme
was a reflection of the faster growth of foreign exchange
outflow than in inflow. The main item of interest in the
outflow account is the debt service which, after.declining
in 1986 to ~2.502.2 million. increased by 43.5 and 128.2
per centto ~ 3,590.6 million and~ 8,193.5 million in 1987
and 1988, respectively. Debt service payments were limited
to these obviously large levels simply because government
had sioce 1986 decided that its debt service capacity would
not exceed 30 per cent of current foreign exchange receipts,
as well as the fact that some payments falling due were not
paid. Overall, taking into account these factors, the foreign
exchange position during the review period indicated a lot
of pressure on the external sector of the economy.
Another variable which mirrored the pressures on the
external sector of the economy was the rising level of external
debt which. among others, gave rise to excessively large debt
service payments mentioned earlier. Between 1981 and 1985,
total external debt outstanding recorded moderate growth
rates, but during the period of structural adjustment, total
external debt outstanding inereased at a very rapid rate. It
moved from only~ 17.3 billion in 1985 to ~41.2 billion
in 1986. ~ 100.8 billion in 1987 and~ 134.0 billion in 1988,
indicating a growth rate of 105.3 per cent a year. This growth
rate was substantially due to the depreciation of the naira
e,i;.change rate. In dollar :errns, the average growth rate was
only 16.1 per cent a year during the review period.
Nevertheless. it is still true that the levels of external debt
ouistanding during the period were substantially higher than
in the preceding period. The size of the external debt could
become problematic when related to some relevant economic
variables such as the levels of expons and domestic output.
Three ratios, namely, debt/exports, debt/GDP and debt
service. commonly used to measure the burden of debt,
showed that the Nigerian debt burden exacerbated during
1986-1988. The debt/export ratio which averaged I IS. 7 per
cent between 198 I and I 985 accelerated to 408. I per cent

External Sector
Three important indicators can be examined to assess the
impact of structural adjustment on the external sector which
was expected to show viability with lhe adjustment process.
These indicators which are not mutually exclusive are the
balance of payments position, foreign exchange flows
through the economy and the level of the external debt. In
fact 1 all lhree indicators pointed to intense pressures on the
external sector of the economy during the programme. The
balance of payments position generally worsened during the
period. The balance of payments position, as measured by
movement of external reserves. which recorded surpluses
in 1984 and 1985, showed deficits of ~784.3 million and
~2.294.1 million in 1986 and 1988, respectively. but a
surplus of-~ 159.2 million in 1987. The surplus recorded
in 1987 wou Id have been a huge deficit, while the deficits
recorded in 1986 and 1988 would have been much larger
if part of the external debt commitments falling due during
the period had not been deferred. This deferment of capital
repayments which merely shifts current liabilities to the furure
became a more imponant feature of the external payments
system during the Programme. The worsening balance of
paymets position stemmed from the deterioration of the
current account. The current account which recorded
surpluses of~ I.S04 .2 million in 1984 and ~ 2,2 I 5 .4 million
in 1985 showed deficits in each of the three years under
review. The current account deficit which was N:2,999.1
million in 1986 declined to a deficit of only ~295.3 million
in 1987. but climbed to ~5,103.3 million in 1988. The
behaviour of the current account was influenced largely by
that of merchandise trade whose surplus was reduced by 32.0
and 25.9 per cent in 1986 and 1988. respectively. although
the quadrupling of the merchandise trade surplus in 1987 was
a welcome development. Another source of deficit in the
current account was the increased levels of deficits on the
services and income account. The d~ficit on thBt account
moved from only ~2.617.7 million in 1985 10 ~6.202.6,
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and incomes derived especially from the higher tempo of
agricultural and other rural activities. Tenns of trade have
moved in favour of the rural areas and hold brighter prospects
for increased productivity generally. Secondly, the recent
policies have removed the bias against prcxtuction for export.
Previously, it was more rewarding to use foreign exchange
to impon finished goods for sale locally. It is still rewarding
to do so, but it is now more suscainable, since foreign
exchange is scarce. to plan production for export which will
yield foreign exchange for the exponer. Thirdly. the radical
change in the allocation of foreign exchange has made the
process less cumbersome and more favourable to those who
produce. The easier access to foreign exchange from official
sources and the constant. flow of foreign exchange to
exponers who choose to keep their earnings in the
domiciliary accounts pennit users of foreign exchange to plan
ahead their production and investment activities. The system
has also encouraged foreign exchange users to look inwards
to procure some of their inputs because foreign exchange
supply to the economy is grossly limited and highly priced.
Fourthly, the package of policies has fostered to a large extent
the culture of repair and maintenance of durable assets,
instead of discarding them for new ones as in the past. There
has also been a changed attitude in favour of jobs that were
despised or looked down upon. Farming, carpentry,
cailoring, refuse collection and other basic occupations are
embraced by both educated and uneducated people alike. This
development has been brought about by the reality that selfreliance is basic to economic survival of the country. 1be
same attitude is reflected in the shift from preference for
imponed foods to local ones. Finally, the new ecooornic
environment created by the adjustment process is freer of
controls and more competitive, a condition which not only
reduces the burden and waste in economic management but
also discourages the pursuit of windfall gains. This has been
observed in the banking industry with positive impact on
savings mobilization and project financing. Also, economic
agents now spend less time finding ways of beatins
regulations.

during 1986-1988. while the debt/GDP ratio increased from
an average of only 16 . 4 per cent in the former period to 114.0
per cent in the laner period. Similarly the officially controlled
debt service ratio (debt service/export ratio) mo\·ed from an
average of 18.6 per cent before the adjustment period to
22.0 per cent during the period. Apart from the traditional
adverse effects of heavy debt burden such as acceleration
of balance of payments deficits, depletion of external
reserves, cunailment of impons and the number of
development projects that could be embarked upon. as well
as inflationary pressures due to possible adverse effect on
the output level, the management of the debt. especially since
the Adjustment Programme was launched in l 986 posed a
heavy demand on national resources which could otherwise
have been deployed for more productive activities.
Efficiency in Resource Allocation
One of the major economic rroblems facing the country
before the adoption of structural adjustment policies was the
high degree of inefficiency in resource allocation in the
economy which resulted in distortions and imbalances
between urban and rural development, domestic and expon
production, foreign exchange allocation between prcxtuction
and consumption as well as acquisition of new assets and
maintenance of existing ones. Economic management which
w~s characterised by controls and discretionary actions
fostered uncompetitiveness and inefficiency in the system.
By and large, the package of policies adopted under structural
adjustment has anempted to reverse these trends and thereby
induced a more efficient allocation of resources, although
the economy is still far from the optimum level of efficiency
and performance. A few of these can be cited.
The most notable is the positively changed environment
of the rural areas ·,is-a-vis the urban areas to the extent that
a good proponion of those who migrated to cities in the
period of the oil boom have staned to return. This has been
induced by the greater resource flows of the rural areas in
the form of increased investments in infrastructural facilities

PART III: SOCIAL IMPACT OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
Inflation Trends

As stated earlier in this paper, structural adjusnnent policies
were introduced in Nigeria to induce a positive tum around
in the ecooomy in the medium to long-term. Inevitably, some
of the shon-run effects of the adjustment process have been
negative for the population, especially the low-income
groups. The n<!ed to address these negative effects has oow
been accepted as a necessary step within the Adjustment
Programme, otherwise the economic gains made would not
be sustained under the weight of the resultant charged social
and political environment. While we discuss the steps taken
to ameliorate the adverse effects of structural adjustment on
the population in Pan IV, we focus here on the dimensions
of the oocial irnpect of the programme. 1be programme
impact on inflation trends and purchasing power,
unemployment, the social services and the distribution of
costs of adjusunent is highlighted in both quantitative and
qualitative terms.

The basic statistic for measuring the inflation trends in the
country is the consumer price index (CPI) compiled by the
Federal Office of Statistics (FOS). There is also the Lagos
Area Retail Price Index (RPI) compiled by the Central Bank
of Nigeria (CBN) using the same broad methodology as in
the FOS survey. Both indices indicate that inflationary
pressures gathered momentum between 1986 and 1988. After
reaching a peak of 39.6 per cent in 1984, the increase in the
FOS CPI nose-dived to 5.5 and 5.4 per cent in 1985 and
1986 respectively. It climbed to 16.2 and 38.3 per cent in
1987 and 1988, respectively. 1be rural index which has in
recent years increased faster than the urban index, as well
as the urban index followed the same pattern of movement.
After recording modest increases between 1985 and 1987.
they both increased substantially by 39.9 and 27.1 per cent
in 1988, respectively. The food component which coolributes
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over 60 per cent of any change in the composite index
a~sumed the same pattern of movement. It increased by 52 .2
per cent in 1988. compared with an average increase of only
4.2 per cent between 1985 and 1987. Similarly. the CBN
CPI increased by 34.2 per cent in 1988, compared with an
average of 10.2 per cent between 1985 and 1987, The food
component of the index increased by 39.3 per cent in 1988.
in comparison with an average of 6. 9 per cent in the previous
three years. The inference that could be drawn from these
price trends is that the inflationary spiral observed during
the Programme was subsrantially generated in 1988, while
the inflation rates in 1986 and 1987 could be considered
tolerable based on past records. Hence, it is clear that the
implementation of structural adjustment policies need not
cause runaway inflation.
.

frozen since 1982 when the Federal Goverment made the
first determined effon to cackle the effects ofreduced export
earnings and revenue from oil. The wage freeze was lifted
in 1988. but wage increa~s gramed were not commensurale
with the increase in the cost of living up to that poinl. It
should be observed that the wage increase granted might have
accelerated the decline in purchasing power. Purchasing
power of workers in the private sector was similarly reduced
because wages were frozen in 1984. However. they appeared
bener cushioned against rising prices because of the much
improved conditions of services relative to the public sector
in the last ten years.

Unemployment
Traditionally. in an expansionary fiscal and monetary
policy regime, such as was witnessed particularly in 1988,
there should be reasonable growth in output and employment.
However, where, as in Nigeria. foreign exchange is a k.ey
resource in production and consumption activities and is
acutely scarce, an expansionary policy tends to aggravate
inflationary pressures rather than generate new employment
opportunities. Estimates show that the employment level
during the programme increased by only one per cent a ·year.
compared with the estimated average increase of 3 per cent
of the labour force. Consequently, unemployment problem
assumed a more serious dimension. However, available
statistics do not always tell the true story of unemployment
in Nigeria, The FOS labour force sample survey shows that
unemployment rates since the Adjustment Programme was
launched have risen generally. The average national
unemployment rate between 1983 and 1985 was 4. 9 per cent,
while it increased to 5. 7 per cent between 1986 and 1988,
However, in an annual basis, the continuous rise was
interrupted in 1986 and 1988 when the rates declined. The
unemployment problem has been more pronounced in the
urban than in the rural areas. Between 1983 and 1985, the
average urban unemployment rate was 8.3 per cent compared
with 9. 7 per cent durir,g 1986-1988. In the rural areas, the
unemployment rate averaged 4.0 and 4.8 per cent in the two
respective periods. Registered unemployment data compiled
by the Federal Ministry of Employment, Labour and
Productivity, subject to the qualification that many
unemployed persons do not bother to register, also seem to
indicate more serious unemployment problem since the
adjusnnent was started. For the lower grade workers, the
total number of registered unemployed persons reached a
peak of 120. 9 thousand in 1984 prior to adjustment. A new
peak of 145 .1 thousand was anained in _I 987_- For the
professional and executive groups, total registration moved
from only 4,3 thousand in 1985 to I 5. I and 16. 8 thousand

One major clue to the inflation problem, especially in 1988,
was the excessive growth in domestic liquidity due to the
large deviations from the fiscal and monetary targets,
especially with regard to government deficit spending
financed mainly by borrowing from the Central Bank. details
of which were given earlier. These developments resulted
in total liquidity as measured by broad money supply (M 2
= MI + quasi-money) growing by 32.8 per cent •in 1988
alone. and this was on top of the 23.9 per cent increase
registered in \ 987. Such excessive growth in liquidity
occurred at a time of inadequate growth of goods and
services, especially food, due to the spill-over effects of the
poor harvest in 1987, as well as limited imports because of
scarcity of foreign exchange. A cost-push element was
introd.uced because the excess liquidity put pressure on the
naira exchange rate which depreciated persistently over the
period as stated earlier. Owing to the fact that production
and consumption activities have continued to depend critically
on imported inputs, there were marked increases in the
production costs and prices of all classes of goods and
services - food, manufactured goods and spare parts. The
increase in the prices of fuel also resulted in higher
transportation costs which in tum affected the distribution
costs of all consumer goods. Another round of inflation was
caused by speculative activities, particularly because of the
demand pressures on the naira exchange rate. For fear of
further exchange rate depreciation, purchasers attempted to
buy more than their normal requirements of foreign
exchange, while others held inventories of goods, part of
which they plaMed to resell to make a good margin. All of
this tended to depreciate the naira exchange rate further and
thereby increase costs and prices. Also because of foreign
exchange scarcity, producers might have patronised the
foreign exchange parallel market where the exchang~ rates
were higher and could therefore further escalate thetr cost
schedule.
.
What is of direct relevance in a high inflation rate 1s the
reduction it induces in purchasing power because nominal
incomes traditionally do not adjust, if at all, pari pas.ru with
inflation levels. The purchasing power of most workers and
self employed persons certainly declined during the
programme due to the high inflation rates and stagnant
incomes. However, this d~velopment had started long befor~
the Programme was launched in 1986. Salaries and fringe
benefits in the public sector, with few exceptions, had been

in 1987 and 1988, respective]). The tight labour market
portrayed by these figures was further bunressed by the
reduced number of vacancies declared and placements for
the two categories of workers both in the pre and postadjustment periods.
The critical nature of the unemployment problem since the
adjustment process began can be discerned by reference to
the rapid expansion of enrolment in the primary. secondary
and tertiary educational institutions between 1979 and 1983.
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transportation fares, water rates, medical charges aod
educational levies have substantially increased during lbc
programme. Thirdly, increased cost of importltioo bal
induced higher v.rvice charges and poorer services. AB in
other sectors, activiti~ in the service sectors depend • lot
on the importation of inputs such as spare parts. Shortqe
of spare parts for motor vehicles, inadequate supply of
chemicals in water schemes and drugs in hospitals, as wdl
as books and other learning materials in educational
institutions have all led to deteriorated services and higher
charges in the service sectors. The general decline aod higher
costs in the social services can properly be observed in lhe
context of the in nation problem mentioned ear Lier, while it
further underpins the miserable plight of the unemployed.

These institutions have been the traditional sources of lhe
supply of new hands in the labour market since 1984 at a
time when the labour market had contracted substantially.
1be public sector which was the pace setter in labour
recruitment has started a massive disengagement of redundant
labour following the economic crisis of the early 1982.
Private sector agencies such as manufacturing firms took
similar action and indeed have been consciously ecooomising
on the use of labour not only because it became more cosdy,
but also as a means of reducing total cost already inflated
by more expensive imported inputs. Though the demand for
labour increased in the rural areas, particularly in the
agricultural sector, because of new incentives mentioned
earlier and there is evidence that many retrenched workers
returned to the rural areas either as new labour or as selfemployed persons. However, the rapid increase in the labour
force and the type of prospective employees were such th.at
increased demand for labour in the rural areas could not
significantly counter the serious national unemployment
problem.
1ne increased unemployment has probably accentuated the
problem of poverty in the country. Unemployed persons have
no purchasing power, except where they depend on a survival
basis on relations whJ themselves have suffered reduced real
incomes. The unemployment problem could also be
associated with the higher incidence of crimes since 1985,
as a result of which national economic growth and inflow
of foreign investment have been hampered.

Distribution.al Effet:ts
From what has been discussed so far, the socio-economic
costs of structural adjustment to the Nigerian population are
not controvenible. That every segment of the population has
borne part of its costs is dear and this is what policy makers
predicted. It is now generally accepted that some measures
need to be taken alongside the adjustment measures to
cushion the adverse effects of the la.tter. But a new dimension
could be introduced if the burden of adjustment is
disproportionately borne by various groups in the population.
If this happens, it must introduce a new policy perspective.
Unfortunately, further consideration of the issue would
introduce qualitative judgements because of the absence of
relevant data.
In tenns of the adjustment process and the long term goal
of national development, two types of distributional effects
can be examined. The first relates to adjustment effects on
the urban and rural areas while the second concerns the
effects on the low and high-income groups. Taking the urbanrural divide first, it is easy to malc.e some assessment from
the fragmentary data presented earlier. With regard to
inOation, the rural areas have suffered more than the urban
areas. Except in 1986, the rurai price index has incre.ased
more than the urban inde.x. The critical year of 1988 showed
that rural prices increased by 39.9 per cent compared with the
27.1 per cent in urban areas. Ironically, food prices increased by 53.7 per cent in the urban areas in the same year.
However, unemployment rates have been much lower in the
rural than in the urban areas. The FOS labour force sample
survey indicated an average unemployment rate of 4.8 per
cent in the rural areas compared with 9 . 7 per cent in the ulblm
areas. The rural areas have traditionally lacked social
services and other amenities when compared with urban
areas. On account of high population densities, the urban
areas could have suffered more following the observed
deterioration in lhe social services. With respect to the low
and high-income classification, it is easier to identify the lowincome classes as the rural peasantry, the urban poor and
the physically disadvantaged. The low income group appears
to have been more affected by increased costs of food,

Deteriorating Socia] Services and Utilities
Traditionally, the perfomance of the social service sectors
in Nigeria has fallen below expectation. 'fhe · supply of
services has not measured up to the effective demand, while
the limited services have not been rendered efficiently. Such
was the situation in the services provided in the
. transportation, water, health and education subsectors,
among others. The main problems of these services, mostly
under the control of the public sector, were financial
indiscipline, political interference, organisational deficiency
and inadequate pricing policies. Except in a few cases, the
performance of the service sectors has dege-nerated in tenns
of the volume and cost of services provided since the
Adjustment Programme was started, which has thus
increased the burden on the population. The problem can be
examined from at least three angles.
Firstly. there has been little or no growlh in the volume
of services provided. This development started long before
the structural adjustment programme arising from the
reduced revenues of the Federal. State and local
governments. Since 1981. only few transportation. water
supply. health and educational facilities have been provided
due to the cutback in government revenue. A new situation
developed in 1986 when the prohibitive costs of providing
such facilities restrained the installation of many new
facilities. Secondly. the gradual removal of subsidies has
resulted in more costly services provided. Increased fuel costs
have adversely affected the costs of all the services in addition
to the increased charges necessitated by the need to achieve
operational viability in the various services. Consequently,

medical care. education and transportation. However, there
has been a clear redistribution of income in favour of the
rural dwellers. panicularly farmers who form the bulk of
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the. low income ea men. following the improved prices of
agnculrural product&. Available data from the POS National
Integrated Survey of Households (NISH) inrlicated that real
incomes fell more rapidly in the urban than in the rural areas

with _the result that living conditions in the rural areas were
relatively better than in the urban area• during the
implementation of the Adjustment Programme.

PART IV: POLICY RESPONSE TO SOCIAL EFFECTS OF ADJUSTMENT
To date, the Federal Government has taken a number of
policy action. to reduce the adverse effects of structural
adjustment policies, particularly on the poor. Specific policy
measurea have been taken to stem inflationary pressures,
generate more employment opponunities and reduce
tran1ponation problem, in the urban areas. These measures
are briefly reviewed below,

inputs such as seeds, water pumps, jute bags, as well as on
land clearing and harvesting. The programme was first
launched in Kano State in 1986/87 and by 1988/89 six other
states, Sokoto, Kaduna, Bomo, Bauchi, Katsina and Plateau
had joined the scheme. A founh measure taken to boost food
1upply and bring down the inflation rate was taken early in
1989 when the Federal Government placed a ban on the
exponation of all grains, tubers and their byproducts.
Simultaneously, all the state governments were ordered to
release for immediate sale at affordable prices to the public
all their food reserves. Similar prohibition had been placed
on the importation of wheat, rice, maize and other major
food poducts much earlier ,,s a way of encouraging farmers
to intensify production activities which would lead to the
achievement of self-sufficiency in these food products.
Finally, monetary and fiscal policies which had been very
expansionary in 1988 were tightened up early in 1989. This
action was taken to mop up excess liquidity from the e<:onomy
and dampen demand pressures generally. For example, of
the overall budget deficit of the Federal Government
amounting to Jlo 12,889.1 million, a sum of"' 2.5 billion is
expected to be realised from draw-down on project loans
while Jlo6.0 billion would be realised from balance of
payments suppon loan. In effect, only Jlo4.4 billion would
be raised from internal sources, compared with an amount
of !lo 12.2 billion in 1988. With the smaller level of borrowing
from the banking system, especially 1he Central Bank,
inflationary pressures would be significantly reduced. With
regard to monetary policy measures the target growth in
money supply (M,) wa, reduced from the 43.9 per cent
achieved in 1988 to 14.6 per cent for fiscal 1989, while the
target increase in aggtegate bank credit was restricted to 9.5
per cent compared with the ac1Ual growth of 26.1 per cent
in 1988. Expansion in credit to Government was targeted
to be 8.3 per cent compared with the 30 per cent rate of
increase in 1988, while credit to the private sector was to
increase by 11.4 per cent in comparison with 21 .6 per cent
increase achieved in 1988. In a bid to funher restrain the
ability of the batiks to expand credit, some amendments have
been made to the monetary policy guidelines announced early
in January 1989. With effect from January 31, 1989, the
Central Bank's Minimum Re<liscount Rate was raised from
12. 75 to 13.25 per cent which would have the effect of
positively influencing the other interest rates and probably
restrain borrowing from lhe banking system Also, with
effect from April 5, 1989. the cash reserve and liquidity ratios
of the banks were raised with the a,m of funher reducing
aggregate demand pressures which have spill-over effecls on
prices and the naira exchange rate.

Anti-Inflation MeuuN11
Since the Structural Adjustment Prosramme was embarked
upon, five important policy measures which could reduce
inflationary pressures have been adopted. The first was the
setting up of the Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural
Infrastructure (DPFRI) early in 1986 to help promote, in
cooperation with state governments, a framework for the
construction and rehabilitation of rural feeder roads, as well
as the provision of other rural infrastructures in a bid to
effectively mobilize the rural peasants for sustained
agricultural transformation. To e~ecute its programme,
DFFRI was allocated 11+500 million in 1986, N,400 million
in 1987, 11+500 million in 1988 and 11+300 million in 1989.
The Directorate's programme consists of four imporbint
elements - rural roads construction and rehabilitation,
agricultural promotion, honicultural development and rural
water •upply and electrification. On the whole, fairly
satisfactory progress has been made in the execution of the
Directorate's programme, and its activities have generated
a lot of interest in many rural communities. But it has been
subjecltid to many criticisms relating to the unduly large
scope of its programme having regard to its limited human
and material resources, inadequate coordination of its
activities in the country and poor quality of some of its
facilities.
Secondly, early in 1988 government lifted the wage freeze
hitherto in force. This step wa, taken in consideration of the
adverse impact of the adjustment programme on workers'
real incomes. In both the private and public secwrs, negotiated increases in salaries and wages were permitted subject to
approval by the Minister of Employmem, Labour and
Poductivity. Under this guideline, most workers in both
sectors obtained wary increases which helped cushion
purchasing power at least in the short-run. Thirdly, both
Federal and State governments intensified their special food
production schemes. the basic elements of which were the
provision of agro-chemicals and improved seeds, the
construction of storage facilities and the promotion of wheat
cultivation in the suitable pans of the country. Under the
Accelerated Wheat Production programme. for example.
wheat fanners are given 50 per cent discount on the cost of
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hy loans for the purchase of inputs and subsistence. Under
the small-scale industry scheme, the Directorate guarantees
loans from banks to young unemployed entrepreneurs
wishing to set up small-scale enterprises which will engage
both themselves and other unemployed persons. In the special
public works programme, unemployed youths are engaged
to execute labour intensive construction projects such as
community roads and buildings in their local government
areas,

Employment Promotion
The Federal Government initiated actions to tad,.le the
unemployment problem early in 1986. In May, the
government ordered the registration of all unemployed
persons in the country. Following that exercise, the Federal
Government in October made a grant of t.25 million to State
and local governments to be used for various agricultural
programmes. as well as providing vocational training for
unemployec.J school leavers. Government formally
inaugurated the National Directorate of Employment charged
with the task of creating job opponunities and to implement
other government measures towards solving the
unemployment problem in the country.
The Directorate has since launched a number of
programmes aimed at creating employment opportunities and

Reducing Urban Transportation Problems
Early in 1988. the Federal Government embarked on a
country-wide programme to ameliorate the urban
transponation situation. It set up the task. Force on Urban
Mass Transit and Transportaion System to review existing
recommendations on mass transit systems for urban areas.
ex.amine the relevance and scope of various transport m<Xies
and propose suggestions and advise on allocation of funds
for the construction of mass transit vehicles and crafts.
Various projects which embraced the major transportation
modes have heen initiated. For instance, under the road
transportation scheme, the Federal Government acquired 939
buses. including spare pans and work.shop equipment, for
distribution to the states and some educational institutions
on a soft loan basis. Most state governments have taken the
opponunity to revamp their transpon corporations or
establish new agencies to implement their mass transit
schemes. Notable actions were also taken to rehabilitate other
transportation facilities throughout the country.

provic.Jing training. finance and guic.Jance to unemployed
persons. The Diret:torate estimated that its activities resulted
in the creation of 142. I anc.J 94.4 thousand new jobs in the
country in 1987 and 1988. respectively. The four primary
programmes designed by the Directorate are the youth
employment and vocational skills, agricultural, small-scale
industries and graduate employment. as well as the special
public works programmes. Under the youth employment
scheme. youths are placed as apprentices in private and puhlic
establishments for one to two years after which they could
be productively absorbed into the labour force. In the
agricultural scheme, land for farming provided by state
governments is distributed to participants who are supported

PART V: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTS
The paper set out to appraise the economic and social
impact of the Structural Adjustment Programme in Nigeria
from 1986 to early 1989. It reviewed the economic Jownturn
in the country following the oil crisis of the early 1980s and
the various control measures which could not arrest the
downturn. thereby necessitating a more swaainable
adjustment process. The SAP introduced in July 1986 was
designed to restructure the production and consumption
patterns of the economy as well as eliminate price Jistortions
and the lop-sided structure of the economy. The three ,·cntral
policy instruments of the programme were the adoption of
a realistic ex.change rate policy alongside a liberalised
external trade and payments system, institution of marketoriented pricing policies which would minimise price
controls, as well as a restructuring and rationalisatior. of the
public sector for more effective performanL"e. The new
exchange rate policy resultec.J in a continuous depreciation
of the naira exchange rate which stood at US $1.(X) =
1><7.5810 at the end of April 1989. bringing the rate nf
depreciation of the naira ex.change rate since Scptc111hcr 1986
to nearly 80 per cent. The Foreign Ex.L"hange Markel has
witnessed a n1easure of stability after th4.• mn).!.111!! of 1hc
official and autonomow, segment., in January 1989. h."iGtl
policy has not ac.Jhcn:J "itrktly to set targets. h·dcral
Government hud~et deficit as a ralio of ODP averaged 7.7
per cent between 1986 anJ 1988, compared with the target
of 3,5 per cent under the Programme. The 1989 budget
attempletl ti, arrest the expansionary fiscal operations <>fthc:

government. Monetary policy was accomm<Xiative of fiscal
expansion resulting in excessive credit creation and the
money supply. Monetary policy has also been properly
redirected by the 1989 budget. Through vigorous debt
restructuring and rescheduling as well as the adoption of a
Debt Conversion programme. external debt management
strategies outlined in the programme were generally
implemented to bring some relief to the external !'iector. The
reform of the Put>lic Sector was initiated and by early 1989
had engenderec.J a lot of momentum.
Overall, the pogramme made some positive economic
impact as reflected in higher domestic output. reduced
reYcnuc dependence on oil. imported industrial inputs and
greater efficiency in resource allocation throughout the
cnmomy. But the external sector was still under severe
prl·ssurc!'i which could have been more serious without the!'
programmL'. With respecl to domestic output. the GDP
inl'rl.!a.scc.J al an annual rate of J.O per cent <luring 1'1861988. compared with the average of 0.8 per cent in the
period. I 98 I -1985. Agricultural production. especially the
cash crop ,.:omponent. performed much better than in the
previous five years. Following the improved pricing and
marketing policies, agrh:ullural exports increase
significantly. The production of major food crops also
increased. but a higher level of Jemand continued to put an
upward pressure on foo<l prices. Produclion and capacity
utilizalion in the manufa1.:turing subsector increased
appreciably largely hecausc of the easier access to foreign
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especially on the poor. While the Programme has stemmed
the emergence of a more serious economic crisis, it is
ne.cessary for government to integrate its efforts to ameliorate
the economic conditions of various income groups suffering
from the, adverse effec-ts of the programme. In implementing
some of the schemes aimed at assisting the poor, it is
necessary to involve the private sector and local governments
for more effective results. In conclusion, it may be staled
that in the context of our present political economy which
has traditionally relied on the principles of free enterprise,
there appears to be no better option that the direction to which
the SAP has now tilted the Nigerian economy, provided, of
course, that the policy package continues to be efficiently
implemented.

exchange for procuring foreign inputs. Efforts to source raw
material needs locally were i.measified, while expon activities
were boosted by the more competitive environment.
Production costs however increased substantially.
Diversification away from petroleum as an imponant
objective of the programme met with some success. There
was a slight shift to non-oil production which partly led to
a decline in the share of oil exporu out of the aggregate,
while the contribution of oil revenue to the total was
somewhat siable. In real terms. the level of imports declined
during the programme, while the strucrure of imports shifted
in rav<>l&r of capital goods and raw materials rather than
consumer goods. The package of policy measures under the
programme induced a more efficient allocation of resources, ah:hough the economy still has a lot of room for
improvement in that regard. Improved terms of trade in
favour of lhe rural areas, expansion of expon activities.
Improved allocation of foreign exchange to priority sectors,
the change.d attirude towards asset maintenance and the more
competitive environment in the economy have all been
brought about by l:he new economic policies. The increased
pressures on the external sector of the economy could not
be attributed to the Programme as such, but could be a
reflection of the persistence of some key economic problems
such as the heavy debt burden. In fact, but for the gains made
under the programme. these pressures could have been
greater.
Some of the side effects of implementing the programme
on the population have been negative. Such effects include
increased inflationary pressures which have reduce.d real
incomes, higher unemployment, deterioration and higher
costs of social services and utilities. as well as the relatively
worsening economic position of the articulate urban dwellers.
Programmes have been mapped out at both the Federal and
State Government levels to minimise these problems. These
include l:he adoption of some anti-inflation measures,
employment promotion activities of the National Directorate
of Employment, the introduction of the mass transit
programme to reduce urban transponation problems and the
adoption of macroeconomic policies to reduce aggregate
demand pressures. It will, however, lake some time before
these measures could make an impact.
From the analysis undertaken in the paper, there is enough
evidence that the Nigerian economy has responde.d positively
to the structural adjustment policies adopted since 1986.
While it may appear to some observers that the beneficial
impact generated by the programme has not been adequate.
it is well to remember the magnirude of the economic crisis
which the Programme was designed to arrest and it may rake
a much longer period to reconstruct the economy than was
needed to bring it down. It usually lakes time for policies
to work themselves out, especially when there are always
conflicts to resolve. It is however acknowledged that there
is a need for all government economic policies to be ~·ell
aniculated and systematically imple~ented as a follow-up
to the core of structural adjustment policies introduced since
1986. Such policies are at present being examin..-d in a
pil.'cemeal fashion. In another ~r~pective. it is easy to overcmphasise the shon-run negative effech of the Programme
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......
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Provisional
Sotlrc~: Returns from Federal Ministry of Finance and Economic Development and Ceni.ral Bank of Nlpria
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DOMESTIC PRODUCTION
(N' Million)

Gross Domestic Product
% Growth
lnde,i;. of lndL1strial production
(1972 = 100)
% Growth
Index of Manufacturing Production
% Growth
% Capacity Utilisation
Index of l\griculrural Production
(1975 = 100)
% Growth
lnde;,; of Food Crop Production
% Growth
ln<lcx of cash .::mp production
~

1

2

Growth

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

78.3
7.0

78.3
0.0

73.8
(5.7)

70.0
(5.1)
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7.9
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3.2

79.3
1.8
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4.0
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{2.8)
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197.2
6.3
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13.2
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(21.6)
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(28.6)
49.l

147.0
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42.0
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15.2
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19.8
37.1
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323.5
(3.9)
38.2

197.6
19.0
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33.6
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220.0
11.3
491.6
13.7
40.7

90.1
0.5
71.6
5,9
124.1
13.4

92.1
2.2
73.8
3.1
122.2

83.9
(8.9)
72.6
(1.6)
108.0
(11.6)

91.4
3.5
81.5
12.3
115.l
6.5

95.8
4.8
88.9
9.1
126.3
9.7

!02.1
6.6
98.6
10.9
125.9
5.3

100.3
(1.8)
93.3
(8.8)
128.7
2.2

103.3
2.9
104.9
12.l
130.6

(l.5)

u

GDP al 1984 factor cost
Provisional
Sc>Mrces: Returns from (1) Office of Budget & Planning, The Presidency, (2) Central Bani( of Nigeria.

Table 4

CRUDE OIL STATISTICS

(Million
barrels)

Exports
(Million
barrels)

Oil fapon 011 Revenue
Earning~ US (Ji'million)
$ million

525.5
470.7
451.0
508.0
547.0
534.2
483,3
525.6

447.8
366.4
341.4
400.4
453.8
447.4
390.5
421.5

17,659.6
12,779.1
9,953.3
11,568.4
12,203, 7
5,469.5
7,575.6
6,4.57.1

Production

1981
1982

1983
1984
1985
1986

1987
1988

8,564.4
7,814.9
7,253.0
8,269.2
10,923.7
8,107.3
19,027 .o
20,933.8

Ratio of Oil
10 Tola!
E~port Earning

98.2
98.6
96.0
97.3
97.1
93.8
92.9
88.4

Ratio of Oil
to Total
Revenue

70.3
66.4

69.0
73.9
74.4
6.5.9
75.8
76.7

Source: Derived from Data Returns of Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation.
Table 5

IMPORTS BY MAJOR GROUPS
()l 'Million)

1981

Consumer Goods
Durable

Non-Durable
Capital Goods
Raw Materials
Miscellaneous

Tola!
1

1982

1983

5,736.3
1.576 2
4,160.1
4.018.0
3.152.4
12.9

4,480.5
861.6
3,618.9
3,532.7
2. 703.4
5),9

3,700.8
858.8
2,842.0
2,886.3
2,307.7

12,919.6

10,770.5

1984

1985

1986

1987

198!1'

8.9

2,656.7
632.5
2,042.0
2.307.2
2.133.3
81.1

2,069.3
247.2
1,822.1
2,486.0
2,493.1
14.2

1,757.8
302.9
1,454.9
2,422.9
1,751.9
6.0

4,304.7
839.5
3,465.2
7,568.0
5,983.7
5.3

7,146.4
249.0
6,897.4
7,957.4
9,785.9
10.7

8,903.7

7,178.3

7,062.6

5,938.6

17,861.7

24,900.4

Provisiunal

Source: Federal Office of Statisrics, IAgos.
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Tlllllt6

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SUMMAllY STATEMENT
fflil 'MWloa)
1981
Current Aa:oum

Merchandiae

Expon (P.0.8)
Import (P.0.B)

Suvic::ea ud Income (Na)
Unrequited Traml'a (Net)
I.DIii Tam CapiUI (Net)
Direct lnvca1ment (Net)

Port l'olio lnvestmem
0mm- L.on,Cerm C'.lpilal (Net)
Buie baluc:e
Odicr Capital (Short ierm) Net
Bl1ani:e oo Curft:111/Capilal Accta

enU
~

·Reaerve Movemem

1982

1983

198S

1984

-3,998.4
-703.S
11,023.3
-11,726.8
-2,948.4
·346.S
833.1
334.7

-3,IOS.7
133.8
9,223.9
-9,090. I
-2,9.50.1
-289.4
1,026.8
290.0

-820.0
l,SOl!.8
7,7Sl.8
-6,243.0
-2,043.0
-28S.8
1,373.8
264.3

498.4
-3,16S.3
170.0
-2,99S.3
•25.5
-3,020.8
+3,020.8

736.8
-2,078.9
204.6
-l,874.3
476.0
-1,398.3
+ 1,398.3

1,10').S

. SSJ.8
-1,102.8
aS49.0
247.7
-JOU
+301.3

l,S04.2
3,839.9
9,138.9
-S,299.0
·2,081.9
-2S3.8
268.7
144.S
207.3
-83.1
1,772.9
-1,391.4
381..5
-26.7
+ 3~4.8
-354.8

2,2lS.4
S,06S. l

11,720.8
-6,6SS.1

·2,617.7
-232.0
-43S.I
434.1
783.0
·1,6S2.2
1,780.3
•l,336.9
443.4
-94.3
+349.l
-349.1

1916

-2,999.l
3,443.9
8,920.5
-S,476.6
-6,202.6
-240.4
.J,191.0
735.8
ISl.6
-4,078.4
-6,190.l
6,206.7
16.6
-800.9
-784.3
+784.3

1987

1

19881

-29S.3
13,968.1
30,360.6

-16,392.S
•14,167.2
-96.2
-7,473.6
2,4S2.8
4,JSl. l
•14,279.S
-7,768.9
9,154.3
I ,38S.4
-1 ,226.2
+ I.S9.2
-l!19.2

-S, 103 .3
I0,347.4
33,138.1
-22,790.7
-IS,396.6

-SU
-9,.27-U

3,871.1
2,611.8
-IS,757.7
-14,378.I
l,23S.2
-2,026.1
-261.0
-2,294.t
+2,294.1

Pro\'ilionlJ.

l

So.n:e: Cenrn.l Bank of Nigeria, Aiuwal Ripon and Slawnvnt of .4cc«il1W' (19111-198&)

Table 7
FOREIGN EXCHANGE

1981

Wlow
Oil

Noa-oil

OUdlow

(a) Vialble
(b) Invlaible
(i) Debt Service
(ii) Otbms
(c)AIIIOllomolla

Nlllflow

12,972.8
10,567.0
2,40!1.8
l!i,993.6
13,379.4
2,614.2
S18.S

2,09!1.7
n.a
-3,020.8

1982

10,064.1
8,197.7
1,866.4
11,462.4
9,S88.9
1,873.!i
77S.2
I ,()')8,3
n.1
-1,S78.3

n.ows 111ROUGH THE ECONOMY
~ 'MJWon)

1984

1983
8,449.7
7,374.1
1,075.6
8,7SI.O
!i,601.2
3,149.11
l,JJS.2
1,814.6
II.a
.301.3

n.a • Not Avlillble
I

Pfoyjaiona)

Sowce: Central Bank ol NiFria, Rmlnu of Fordp ~ralio,u Dq,amnenl.
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l98S

9,263.6
8,418.9
844.7
8,908.6
!i,204.8
3,703.8
Z,640.!i
1,063.3
D.I

+J!IS.O

11,024.1
10,lll0.9
843.2
10,463.0
5,032.!i
!i,430.S
3,717.8
1,712.7
a.a
+!161.1

1916

12,496.1
8,293.0
4,203.1
9,7S2.7
S,667.l
4,08!1.6
2,.502.2
l,S83.4
n.a
+2,743.4

1987 1 •
26,429.6
18,769.5
7,660.1
21,037.0
l!i,818.0
S,219.0
3,590.6
1,628.4
D,I

+S,392.6

19881
29,IS9.0
21,808.0

7,351.0
27,912.7
14,886.7
10,033.1
8,193.S
1,839.6
].,992.9
+ 1,246.3

- G N DCIIANGII ft.OWS, DOM118'11C LIQlJIJIITY AND TBII NADA DCIIANGII RATII

B•""'Z,ln1low
us•w
)

~

,_

Ponlplloffl

D I ~ (US

MonMory

Oil

Non-Oil

(I)

(2)

17,'7U
12,171.5
10,192.5
11,016.1
11,367.2
5,742,5
4,6'9.~
4,151.5

1911
11182

1913
19"'
1915
19111

1917

1911

Sowa: DorlVld -

3,977.7
2,77'2,7
1,416.7
1,105.3
943,0

1,461.1
1,934.~
l,"6,1

(I) + (2)
(3)

IDlorvlcolbo

~) ~ ;:r

Debi

llrvloo

(-')

(4)

157,4
1,151.6
1;143,5
3,4,,,I
4,ll0.4
2,127.2
1,567,0
1,953.1

21,"4!1,2
14,951.2
11,679.2
12,121.4
12,310.2
7,20<,I
6,'93,7
6,411.3'

20,591.1

13,1!111,6
9,133.7
1,666.3
1,129.1
5,076.9
5,026,7
4,652.2

N_,.,.,

Ttmoud

~
(M,)
(6)

~J/l

Savlllp

Naln/US
Dollar

Broad

M-

...,., Avnp
for potjod
(N - . ,

Avllllblo
Dollar (N)

(I)

(9)

(I) ; (5)
(10)

Mi

5,103.2

1,086.5

9,J96.•

10,5,0,8
11,417, 7
15,011.7
11,397.2

20,052.7

8"'-

(7)

1',541.1
16,193.9
19,361.9
21,600.5
23,811.6
24,216.0
29,990.6
31,"9,9

6,kU

14,905.9

+

(6)

(7)

9,774.9
10,<Ml,5
· 11,212.•
12,:11>4.I
13,267,I
12,721,3

Unlu or
Do-

or Period)

(II' mllllon)

N•

TOCII

~ (Bad

mllllan)

0.6048
0.6731
0.7235
0,7642
0.1924

U300
3.7236
4.5365

~o/" •

0,76
1.22
1.117

2.09

2,93
4,77
5.117
1.26

llllilr T-.

T-9
UTIIIINAL PUBLIC DDT (JIND Of PIIRIOD)
(1111'~
1981

1982

8,0C3.9
5,111.3
612,5
2,331.2
22.3
4,5
5.0

$owe,:

1983
17,7,S,4
12,"4$,0
2,267,3
10,577,7
141.0
17,4
17,6

1•,714.5
10,117.1
1,367,7
1,819.4
IOI.I
16, 1
1,0

198'

1915

20,982.7
17,703,5
3,1~.9
14,536.6
160,0
21.2
29, 1

29,337.8
23,195.0
5,90C,4
17,290.6
1'4.2
21.9
33,2

1916

1987

1981

'7,029.0

142,302.6
123,522.2
22,734.6
100,787,6
333,3
127.1
11.9

U2,U7.I

48,171.3
7,710.4
41,160.9
486.9
52,8
29.4

164,512.0
30,626.0
133,956.3

404,2

162,2
24,7

ReNma from: (a) Peden.I Ministry of Financt and Bconomic:: Developmtn.t, (b) Central Bank of Nigeria

T-10

CHANGES IN CONSUMU ,_ICE INDICES
~I

1975 • 100)

(Pv Caal)

C

•••

'
,c:_..-.

-

2. ~ - -

(~-)

r.-

Accamn datlon

I 11d Oooda
Cladlilla

"'
r_,

Otllll'-

...........

3, Urlla lllllo•
4,

1911

1912

1913

1914

1915

1986

1917

19'1

20,9

7,7

23,2

39,6

5,5

5,4

10,2

39.3

25.2
2,7
15.5
-2,3
7,2
16.1
2.3
20.2
20,7
20.8

8.9
7.6
2.6
3.9
9.7
6.7
10.9
4,7
7,6
7.7

23,2
13,5
14.7
33,1
53,7
18.I
21.1
20.7
20,0
23,7

42.9
23,1
36.9
12,7
57,3
40.8
16.4
31.9
41.2
39,4

B
30.9
25,1
-4,5
5,0
9.0
13.1
23.2
2.9
5,9

0.1
10.9
22.6
40,6
30.8
15.4
18.2
36.3
10.1
4.7

1.6
1,6
14.1
4,3
11,3
11.9
13.2
21.1
7,0
10.7

52,2
4,9

Sow«: Derived from ...,-ns of Peden.I Office of Statistics, Laaos
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I.I

-5,5
3.0
10.6
15,7
7,4
27.1
39.9

Table 11
ANNUAL AVERAGE RETAIL PRICE INDICES
(Bue: NOV. 1975 = 100)

Components

I. Food
A. Stapks
B. Meat. Fish & Eggs
C. Oils & Fats
D. Veg., Fruits & Nuts
2. Beverages & Drinks
3. Tobacco
4. Fuel & Light
5. Clothing
All Items

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

19118

4611.3
535.6
421.3
276.8
385.4
278.5
186.3
274.3
335.,
401.l

,10.2
586.4
486.1
267.0
456.8
287.7
209.4
302.9
364.1
426.4

614.2
650.0
584.8
612.9
545.3
311.6
210.8
343.0
467.9
505.4

8l0.7
841.2
917.7
982.8
646.2
452.I
234.3
340.6
629.4
696.9

870.6
788.8
1,073.9
792.9
676.9
576.8
261.9
359.7
777.3
762.3

944.1
682.3
1,249.9
754.9
890.7
644.9
300.1
719.1
1,046.7
867.6

1,037.7
792.2
1,389.9
liOl.6
931.9

1,44,.8
1;382.2
1,690.4
1,061.7
975.9
858.3
537.8
684.6
1,l05.8
1,2,<J.4

640.,

35&.3
591.9
1,457.1
931.l

SoMrce.- Cenual Bant of Nigeria

Table 12
UGIS'IEIIED UNEMPLOYMENT, VACANCIES DECLARED AND NATIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT RATES

1982
LOWER GRADE WORKERS (NO)

Total Registration
Old Registration
Fre~h registration
Re-registration
Vacancies Declared
Placement~
PROFESSIONAL AND EXECUTIVES (NO)
Total Registration
Old registration
Fresh registra1ion
Re-regis1ration
Vacancies Declared
Placements
NATIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT RATES(%)
National Rate·
Urban rate
Rural rate

106,496
15,688
59,259
31,549
19,943
8,276

1983
112,588
25,131
55,339
32,118
18,310
7,394

3.4
7.3
2.4

Sources: Returns from:

Federal Ministry of Employment, Labour and Productivity.
(2) Federal Office of Statistics, Labour Force Sample Survey.

(I)

'"
·"

1985

1986

120,945
30,670
50,108
40,167
14,612
3,865

96,580
27,926
36,039
32,615
11,156
2,139

85,158
27,210
31,273
26,675
13,0lO
2,378

2,514
706
1,324
484
955
26

4,264
1,2)4
2,038
992
748
145

5.1
7.9
4.4

6.1
9.8
5.2

1984

1987

1988

145,084
33,967
79,718
31,399
16,l02
4,988

116,162
66,625
30,003
19.534
l4,IS4
2,506

6,123.
2,295
2,329
1,499
606
148

15,100
2,116
10,917
2,067
444
175

16,759
9,031
4,046
3,682
591
282

5.3
9.1
4.6

7.0
98
61

IO.I

4.7
3.8

